In the Matter of The New and Used Motor Vehicle Dealer\u27s License, Dick and Lavonne Noren, dba Central R.V. Sales : Brief of Respondent-Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
In the Matter of The New and Used Motor Vehicle
Dealer's License, Dick and Lavonne Noren, dba
Central R.V. Sales : Brief of Respondent-Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
David M. Bown; Attorney for Petitioner-Respondent;
Robert B. Hansen; Mark K. Buchi; Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Noren, No. 16521 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1777
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
The New and Used Motor 
Vehicle Dealer's License, 
DICK and LAVONNE NOREN, dba 
Central R.V. Sales 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLANT 
' Case No. 16'521, ,:, 
UTAH STATE MOTOR VEHICLE BUSINESS ADMINI§NU~i~ 
•. 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SAI4' ~· . 
HONORABLE ERNEST F. BALDWIN PRES:Dri~~r::, 
;·.1,. 
----------------------------~--~~ 
DAVID M. BOWN 
3007 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Attorney for Petitioner-
Respondent Dick and Lavonne Noren, 
dba Central R.V. Sales 
ROBERT B. RAMSER 
Attorney Ge:rfeJ'al. 
MARK K. MfeHI'. 
Assistaat AttorR~ 
236 State Capi~l 
Salt Lake City, l)f· · 
. '"'~ ) 
Attorneys 
Appellant Adminis~ra·~ 
the Utah State 
Business Admini~~L~~~~1 
SEP -7 1979 
-------------------- -- .. -------~· 
"-.._ Plork, Su~romo Court, Wol• 
'· 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATE!•1ENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
~LIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED 
TO TAKE COGNIZA..""CE OF RESPONDENT'S TWO 
PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS IN DECIDING 
HIS FITNESS TO HOLD A PUBLIC LICENSE 
POINT II: WHETHER THE APPEAL AND ORIGINAL 
ACTION PROVIDED FOR IN UTAH CODE ANN. 
§41-3-26 IS A REVIEW OR A TRIAL DE NOVO, 
THE DISTRICT COURT IS LIMITED TO DECIDING 
WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATOR ACTED PROPERLY 
IN DENYING THE APPLICATION FOR A DEALER'S 
LICENSE .......... . 
POINT III: AS THE INSTANT PROCEEDING IS A 
REVIEI\T OF THE RECORD OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEEDING, THE FACTS BEFORE THIS COURT 
ARE THE FACTS AS THEY EXISTED ON THE DATE 
OF THE HEARING BEFORE THE ADVISORY BOARD 
CONCLUSION 
1 
1 
2 
2 
4 
9 
20 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES AND CASES CITED 
Boise \•later Corp. v. Idaho Public Utili ties Comm' n, 97 Idaho 
832, 555 P.2d 163 (1976) . . . . ... 18 
CamP v. Pitts, 93 S. Ct. 1241, 411 U.S. 138, 36 L. 
Ed. 2d 106 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
Central Bank and Trust Co. v. Brimhall, 28 Utah 2d 14, 
497 P.2d 638 (1972). . . . . . . . 14 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. VolPe, 401 U.S. 402, 
28 L. Ed. 2d 136, 91 S. Ct. 814 (1971) . . . . . . 15 
Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. Central Weber Sevier Improvement 
District, 4 Utah 2d 105, 287 P.2d 884 (1955) . 15 
Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. P.S.C., 98 Utah 431, 100 P.2d 
552 (1940) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
Heldenbrand v. Hontana St. Bd. of Reg. for P.E. & L.S., 
147 ~1ont. 271, 41 P.2d 744 (1966). . . . . 22 
Household Finance Corp. v. State, 40 Wash. 2d 451, 244 
P.2d 268 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
In re. Phillips, 17 Colo. 2d 55, 109 P.2d 344 (1941). 
Merrill v. Merrill, 83 Idaho 306, 362 P.2d 887 (1961) 19 
Meyer v. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 34 Colo. 2d 62, 206 
P. 2d 1085 (1949) . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Opp. Colton l•1ills v. Administrators, 312 U.S. 126, 85 L. 
Ed. 6 2 4 , 61 S . Ct. 52 4 ( 19 41) . . . . . . . 
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Dept. of Public Utilities, 14 ~.J. 
411, 102 A.2d 618 (1954) . . . . . . . . 18 
People ex rel. Deneen v. Gilmore, 214 Ill. 569, 73 N.E. 
737 (1905) . . . . . . ... 
Peterson v. Livestock Comm'n, 120 Mont. 140, 181 P.2d 
152 (1947) .... 12' 13 
Rovlley v. P.S.C., 112 Utah 116, 185 P.2d 514 (1947) 20 
ii 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
state of Utah v. u.s. I 304 F.2d 23 (lOth Cir. 1962) I 
cert. denied 83 S. Ct. 47, 371 U.S. 826, 9 L. Ed. 
2d 65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19 
sulger v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n I 5 Ariz. App. 69, 423 
P.2d 145 (1967) . . . . . . . . . .. 14 
United States v. District Court, 121 Utah l, 238 P.2d 
1132 (1951) . . . . . . . . 10,12 
~itney v. Continental Life, 89 Idaho 96, 403 P.2d 
573 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . ... 19 
STATUTES CITED 
5 u.s. c. 1 § 556 (d) 5 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-8 (3) (a) 4,5,20 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-9 15 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-24 .15,17 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-25 . 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-26 9,10,11,12,17,19,20 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17.5 8 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52 (a) 17,18 
Utah R. Civ. P. 81 (d) 6,17 
CONSTITUTIONS CITED 
UTAH CONST. art. V, § l . . . . . . ......... ll 
SECONDARY SOURCES CITED 
2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 701 12 
Kerper and Keroer, LEGAL RIGHTS OF '::'HE CO'<VICTED (1974) 6 
\·lriq;1t and Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Vol. 9 
(1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
iii 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
The New-Used Motor 
vehicle Dealer's License, 
DICK and LAVONNE NOREN, dba 
central R.V. Sales 
Case No. 16521 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The respondent-appellant, Administrator of Motor 
Vehicle Business Administration, appeals from a decision of 
the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, which ordered 
the Administrator to grant the application of petitioners-
respondents for a New-Used Motor Vehicle Dealer's License and 
to duly license them under the laws of the State of Utah. 
Jurisdiction was conferred uPon the Third District Court by 
wayofastatutorily provided appeal from a decision of the 
Administrator after he adopted the findings of the Advisory 
Board to deny the application for a New-Used Motor Vehicle 
Dealer's License. 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
This case carne before the Third District Court as an 
appeal from the decision of the Administrator of Motor Vehicle 
Business Administration in which the Administrator denied the 
application of Dick and LaVonne Noren for a New-Used Motor 
Vehicle Dealer's License. The Administrator filed motions for 
publication of the transcript of the hearing held before the 
Advisory Board to the Administrator and for summary judgment. 
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The law and motion judge for the Third District Court heard 
'arguments on the Administrator's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and denied the same. The matter then proceeded to trial where, 
pursuant to stipulation by the respective counsel in open court, 
the Third District Court Judge narrowed the issue to that of 
deciding as a matter of law whether the proceeding in district 
court was a trial de novo or a review of an administrative 
decision. The court took U1e matter under advisement. A memo-
randum of law was filed by the Administrator after which the 
court ordered that the Administrator of the Motor Vehicle 
Business Administration forthwith grant the application of the 
petitioners for a New-Used Motor Vehicle Dealer's License. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Third District Court 
decision wherein the court substituted its judgment for that of 
the administrative body and an order affirming the decision of 
the Administrator of Motor Vehicle Business Administration in 
denying the respondents' application for a New-Used Motor 
Vehicle Dealer's License. 
STATE~~NT OF FACTS 
In January of 1979 the respondents filed with the Motor 
Vehicle Business Administration an application for a New-Used 
Motor Vehicle Delaer's License (R. 15). The application was 
proper insofar as the formal requirements prescribed. Sub-
sequently, the Administrator issued notice of an order to show 
cause hearing which notified the applicants that the Administra-
- 2 -
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tor was contemplating denying the application on the grounds 
that Richard Scott Noren had been convicted in the City Court 
of Salt Lake City, Utah for two separate violations of the 
Motor Vehicle Code, failure to deliver a certificate of title, 
and acting as a used-motor vehicle dealer without a license 
(R. 15). Pursuant to statute, the Administrator directed the 
hearing on the order to show cause to be held before the 
Advisory Board. This statutorily created Advisory Board con-
ducted a formal hearing on March 12, 1979. A stenographic 
record of the hearing of temtimony, offers of proof and oral 
argument were made. The Board took the matter under advisement and 
subsequently issued formal findings of fact and a recommenda-
tion that no motor vehicle dealer's license be issued to the 
applicants therefor, for the reason of Richard Scott Noren's 
prior criminal convictions. Thereafter, the Administrator 
adopted the Advisory Board's findings of fact and ordered that 
no motor vehicle dealer's license be issued. 
Pursuant to statute, the applicants appealed from the 
decision of the Administrator to the Third District Court by 
filing an original action. Prior to such an appeal, the appli-
cants' motion to set aside his prior convictions was granted 
by the Honorable Raymond F. Uno of the Fifth Circuit Court 
(R. 16) . The Administrator filed motions for publication of 
the transcript of the hearing held before the Advisory Board 
to the Administrator and for Summary Judgment (R. 4-6). The 
Law and Motion Judge for the Third District Court heard argu-
ments on the Administrator's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
- 3 -
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denied the same (R. 12) . The matter then proceeded to trial 
where, pursuant to stipulation by the respective counsel in 
open court, the Third District Court Judge narrowed the issue t: 
that of deciding as a matter of law whether the proceeding in 
district court was a trial de novo or a review of an adminis-
trative decision. The court took the matter under advisement 
(R. 13). A memorandum of law was filed by the Administrator 
(R. 20-36) , after which the court ordered that the Administrator 
of the Motor Vehicle Business Administration forthwith grant lli 
application of the petitioners for a New-Used Motor Vehicle 
Dealer's License (R. 18). 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO 
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF RESPONDENT'S TWO 
PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS IN DECIDING 
HIS FITNESS TO HOLD A PUBLIC LICENSE. 
The trial court erred in excluding evidence of Richard 
Scott Noren's two prior criminal convictions for violations of 
the Motor Vehicle Dealers' Act. Utah Code Ann. §41-3-8, author-
izes the Motor Vehicle Business Administrator to refuse to 
issue a license to a partnershir:> applicant where he determines: 
(3) {a) . that one or more of the partners 
though not previously the holder of a license, 
was convicted in a court of record in the state of 
Utah of a violation of one or more of the terms 
and provisions of this act or of a rule or regula-
tion promulgated by the administrator under the 
authoritv herein conferred uPon him; and (b) that 
by reaso~ of the facts and circumstances touching 
the organization, control, and management of the 
partnership or corporation business is likely that 
the policy of such business will be directed, con-
trolled, or managed by individuals who, by reason 
of their conviction of a violation of the pro-
- 4 -
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vtsions of this act, would be ineligible for a 
llcense and that by licensing such corporation 
or partnership the purposes of this act would 
likely be defeated. 
Whether sitting asa review tribunal or as if it were 
the administrative body, the district court was bound to con-
sider Mr. Noren's convictions of the Motor Vehicle Dealers' 
Act as evidence of his fitness for a public license. The 
legislature went to great length to specify that a conviction 
of a criminal violation of the very act which an applicant for 
an automobile dealer's license would be obliged to uphold,would 
be grounds for denying such a license. In its own words, the 
legislature stated that such a conviction demonstrates that 
the purposes of the Motor Vehicle Dealers' Act "would likely be 
defeated." In short, it is evidence of bad character and an 
individual possessing such character should not be trusted 
with a public license in an area of business so prone to con-
sumer fraud and injury. 
In the administrative setting, exclusionary rules have 
no applicability where evidence of good character is material 
and relevant. On the federal level, this is mandated in 
Title 5, u.s.c., §556(d). That provision excludes administrative 
hearings from the ambit of the exclusionary rules, through the 
Administrative Procedure Act. The standard which is applied to 
the admissability issue is materiality and relevancy. The 
reason being, that the hearings are conducted in front of experts 
selected from the field of concern, and not in front of jurors 
selected for their "naivete'." All evidence is admitted which 
will aid the administrative body in its decision making. 
- 5 -
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The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the same standard in 
Oop Colton Mills v. Administrators, 312 U.S. 126, 85 L.Ed. 624, 
61 S.Ct. 524 (1941): 
. . [I] t has long been settled that the 
technical rules for the exclusion of evidence 
applicable in jurv trials do not apply to pro 
ceedings before federal administrative agencies 
in the absence of a statutory requirement that 
such rules are to be observed. at 155 (emphasis added), 
There is no such statutory requirement in Utah, and the 
Utah Rules of Evidence are not applied to administrative hear-
ings, unlike the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which are 
applied pursuant to Rule Sl(d). 
Because the exclusionary rules do not apply to administra· 
tive hearings, the Advisory Board was correct in admitting and 
weighing evidence of petitioner's prior criminal convictions, 
and it would still be correct in so admitting and weighing such 
evidence if it were to rehear the matter, because the evidence 
should not be excluded from the administrative hearing. It 
is both material and relevant to petitioner's dealership licensE 
application. 
This proposition finds support in case law and treatise 
discussion. In the area of licensing, most courts and legisl~ 
tures have decided that a showing of "good character" is of 
the utmost importance. In Legal Rights of the Convicted, 
Kerper and Kerper, 1974, the authors observe that in determini~ 
an applicant's good character, administrative bodies have not 
been confined to rules of evidence when they wrote: 
Although pardon and other forms of 
wiping out a conviction may remove particular 
civil disabilities, and, for example, permit 
- 6 -
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the convicted person to vote or serve on a jury, 
such a pardon or expungement proceeding does not 
necessarily, or even by implication restore 
"good character." [C)onviction of a crime 
is generally held to be evidence that the offender 
lacks the requisite character for the professional 
license. Legal Rights of the Convicted at 
44-45 (emphasis added). 
The authors further explained at 821, that: 
Generally, where an occupational licensing 
law disqualifies persons convicted of cr1me, 
pardon does not remove the disqualification nor 
does it automatically restore a license that 
has been revoked on the ground of a criminal 
conviction." See People ex rel. Deneen v. Gilmore, 
214 Ill. 569, 73 N.E. 737 (1905) (emphasis added). 
Appellant refers the court to two specific examples 
wherein courts have upheld administrative license revocations 
or denials despite the fact that the basis for the denials 
(criminal convictions) were pardoned or set aside. In Meyer v. 
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 34 Colo.2d 62, 206 P.2d 1085 (1949), 
the court upheld a doctor's medical license revocation by the 
Board of Examiners, even though the conviction was set aside 
following a probation period. The court reasoned that it was 
not the legislative intent to "obliterate the record" and "purge 
him of the guilt" "for all purposes" as if no action had "ever 
been presented against him." 206 P.2d at 1088. Similarly, in 
In Re Phillips, 17 Colo.2d 55, 109 P.2d 344 (1941), the court 
upheld a disbarrment of an attorney holding that the lifting 
of his sentence by probation did not affect the fact that he 
was adjudged guilty of committing the crime as charged. It only 
served to restore some of his lost civil liberties. 
The facts in the instant case do not cause any distinction 
:rom the above cases because the statute used to set aside 
- 7 -
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Mr. Noren's convictions does not operate to destroy evidence 
of his prior convictions from consideration as to his fitness 
to possess a motor vehicle dealer's license. 
Utah Code Ann., §77-35-17, creates a remedy whereby 
persons may have a trial court "terminate or set aside a plea 
of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and dismiss the action 
and discharge the defendant." This statute was interpreted by 
the Utah Supreme Court and was distinguished from Utah Code 
Ann., §77-35-17.5, the section pursuant to which an expungement 
motion is made. 
the court noted: 
In State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876 I (Utah 1975), 
[Under §77-35-17) [T)he court can-
not seal the record, restrict its inspection, 
nor bring into operation circumstances which 
would allow a response to inquiries relating 
to a conviction of crime, as though such con-
viction had never occurred. The court can 
terminate the sentence, set aside a defendant's 
plea of guilty, the conviction, dismiss the 
action, and discharge the defendant . 
Id. at 878. 
Thus, Mr. Noren is not able to respond that he has never 
been convicted of a crime. Likewise, his record is not sealed 
as it would be under a motion granted pursuant to §77-35-17.5. 
If Mr. Noren may not deny his convictions in a judicial pro-
ceeding then, a fortiori, under the rules noted earlier, he 
h . · · · d · · · d. I must answer as to lS convlctlons ln a mlnlstratlve procee lngs.: 
The evidence of his conviction is very much material and rele-
vant and there is no basis for its exclusion as his guilt will 
always exist, even though the remainder of his sentence has 
been waived. 
- 8 -
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As the only proper basis cited by the lower court for a 
reversal of the order of the administrator was the absence of 
any evidence of the convictions, the lower court erred and should 
be reversed. Furthermore, as the district court should have 
taken cognizance of Mr. Noren's convictions, it should have 
sustained the Administrator's decision as a proper exercise of 
his discretion in following the provisions of Utah Code Ann., 
§41-3-8. 
POINT II 
h'HETHER THE APPEAL AND ORIGINAL 
ACTION PROVIDED FOR IN UTAH CODE 
ANN. §41-3-26 IS A REVIEW OR A 
TRIAL DE NOVO THE DISTRICT COURT 
IS LIMITED TO DECIDING WHETHER THE 
ADMINISTRATOR ACTED PROPERLY IN DENYING 
THE APPLICATION FOR DEALER'S LICENSE. 
On the day of the trial, the trial court narrowed the 
issue to be decided to whether Utah Code Ann., §41-3-26, pro-
vided a true trial de novo or whether it merely provided for 
a review of the Administrator's decision. If it was a true 
trial de novo, the judge would take cognizance of the setting 
aside of the convictions and reverse the Administrator. If 
the proceeding was a review, the judge must uphold the Admin-
istrator's decision. In making its decision, the lower court 
specifically found it did not have to decide the case upon the 
issue under which it took the case under advisement. After 
noting this conclusion, the trial court erroneously continued: 
"[T]he court finds in either event, the reviewing court would 
have been allowed to take into consideration a change of under-
lying £'acts . 
- C) -
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This court decided a similar case to the instant one 
and held that a court reviewing the decision of an administrator 
charged with deciding the appropriateness of an application 
"should simply determine whether the application was rightly 
rejected." United States v. District Court, 121 Utah, 238 P.2d 
1132, 1135 (1951). In that case the Court was reviewing a 
decision of the State Water Engineer. The legislature had pro-
vided a statutory scheme very similar to the one governing this 
proceeding. The legislature provided that any person aggrieved 
by the Engineer's decision may bring an "action in the district 
court for a plenary review thereof" and that the hearing there~ 
"shall proceed as a trial de novo." The Utah Supreme Court took 
the use of the terms "review" and "trial de novo" as an indica-
tion that the court shall review only the issues of law and 
fact which were involved in the Engineer's decision. 
Utah Code Ann., §41-3-26, provides a similar review 
standard as involved in United States v. District Court when it 
states that an applicant for a dealer's license may "appeal" by 
filing "an original action in district court." Thus, the trial 
court in the current controversy should have "simply determine [d: 
whether the application was rightly rejected." This conclusion 
is correctly based on several different points of law. 
The first point which supports such a conclusion will be 
more extensively discussed in Point III, infra, but basically 
states that the facts before ~he district court and hence this 
court are the ones that existed on the date of the hearing 
before the Advisory Board. 
- 10 -
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The second point in favor of construing the instant 
action as a review of the case as it existed at the time the 
administrative decision, i.e. a review, is the rule of statutory 
construction which provides that if two interpretations of a 
statute are possible, one constitutional and the other unconsti-
tutional, the constitutional construction will be the governing 
interpretation. This rule is relevant in the instant proceed-
ing due to art. V. sec. 1 of the Utah Constitution which reads: 
The powers of the government of the 
State of Utah shall be divided into three dis-
tinct departments, the Legislative, the 
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person 
charged with the exercise of oowers-properly 
belonging to one of these departments, shall 
exercise any functions appertaining to either 
of the others, except in the cases herein ex-
pressly directed or permitted. (Emphasis added.) 
The lower court concluded that it was able to take cog-
nizance of a withdrawal of convictions which were the basis of 
the Administrator's decision. In doing so, the court necessarily 
decided that it had jurisdiction of the case in a trial de novo. 
Such a construction of Utah Code Ann., §41-3-26, is an uncon-
stitutional one. 
Similar separation-of-powers language is found in most 
all state constitutions and it is this type of provision which 
has led to a view that true de novo trials are traditionally 
disfavored in legislative and administrative areas since, in 
essence, the court would be forced to exercise a power which 
has been expressly reserved to another branch of government by 
constitutional mandate. This would follow in this case since 
- 11 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the district court has no authority to issue a motor vehicle 
dealer's license upon application; such a power is reserved to 
the legislature. 
Just as the United States v. District Court, the Court 
found the term "de novo" had a more restrictive meaning, other 
courts have conformed to the constitutional separation of 
powers restriction by giving statutes which provide for a trial 
or hearing de novo, a restrictive construction which precludes 
a court from substituting its judgment for that of the admin-
istrative agency. See 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law, §701. 
The authors continue with a statement very much in point to the 
instant controversy. 
A fortiori, statutes which do not 
expressly provide for trial de novo or substi-
tution of judgment but are asserted to authorize 
such substitution of judgment by the court will 
not be given that construction where it is not 
necessary. Id. at 603 (emphasis added). 
As §43-3-26 merely provides for an appeal and an original actioo, 
it is not necessary to give it the unconstitutional de novo 
interpretation. 
The Montana Supreme Court adopted the entire line of 
thinking set forth above in Peterson v. Livestock Commission, 
120 Mont. 140, 181 P.2d 152 (1947), when it held that the court 
may not exercise nonjudicial powers but may only review as to 
the lawfulness of the decision when it stated: 
The lower court as well as this court 
may not substitute their discretion reposed 
in boards and commissions bv leqislatlve act. 
(Citations omitted.) -
A statute authorizing an appeal to a 
court from actlons of a nonJUdlClal body lS 
- 12 -
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n, 
unconstitutional in so far as it ourports to 
foist nonjudicial functions on th~ court, or 
invade the powers of such body, as by 
empowering a court to control its executive 
or administrative discretion. (Citations omitted.) 
It is generally held that a statute 
which attempts to place the court-rn-~lace 
of a commission or board to try a matter anew 
as an administrative body is unconstitutional 
as a delegation to the judiciary of nonjudicial 
powers (Citations omitted.) 
Statutes providing for appeals somewhat 
similar to that under consideration have been 
held valid by interpreting them as not granting 
trials de novo in the full sense of that ex-
pression but as conferring authority for the 
court to pass upon the lawfulness only of the 
order of the board or commission. (Citations 
omitted.) Id. at 157 (emphasis added). 
The Washington Supreme Court cited the Peterson 
case when it held a statutory provision, granting a trial de 
novo to an applicant for a license, unconstitutional. Household 
Finance Corp. v. State, 40 Wash.2d 451, 244 P.2d 260 (1952). 
The Washington court upheld the trial court in its conclusion 
that the scope of judicial inquiry under the de novo statute 
was "limited to determining whether or not the supervisor had 
acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law." Id. at 
262. After noting that the licensing and regulation of small 
loan companies was a legislative and administrative function, 
the court held: 
We are constrained to hold that the por-
tion of Rem.Supp.I941, §8371 23, whlch purports 
to vest ln the superlor court for Thurston 
county the rlght to reverse on a trlal de novo 
a declSlon of the supervlsor Wlth reference to 
the grantlng of such. a llcense and, ln effect, 
to substltute lts JUdgment for that of the 
supervlsor as to whether or not a llcense should 
issue, lS unconstltUtlonal as an attempt to 
vest a nonJudicial power ln a constitutionally 
- 13 -
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created court. We must reject this expansion 
of the court's power as firmly as we would 
resist a reduction of its rightful authority. 
Id. at 263 (emphasis added). 
The Arizona Supreme Court has interpreted Arizona's 
various statutes which provide for appeals from administrative 
actions in de novo hearings in district court as only providing 
the means for the trial court to reach an independent conclusi~ 
See Sulger v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 5 Ariz. App. 69, 423 P.2d 
145 (1967). 
This court has similarly expressed the intent to limit 
the scope of judicial review of administrative proceedings. In 
Central Bank and Trust Co. v. Brimhall, 28 Utah 2d 14, 497 P.2d 
638 (1972); the court stated: 
Our duty is to look upon the whole 
evidence in the light favorable to the determination 
made by the Bank Commissioner and the trial court, 
and to sustain them if there is a reasonable basis 
in the evidence to justify doing so. 
In the field of administrative law the 
assumpt~on ~s lndulged that tne adm~nlstrator 
(or admin~strat~ve trlbunal) possess superlor 
knowledge and expertlse because of speclallzed 
tralning and experlence and the focus of 
lnterest Wlthln the Partlcular f~eld. For 
thls reason the well~es~abllshed rule ~s that 
the court lndulge ~n hlm conslderable latltude 
~n determ~natlons he revokes . . and they 
Wlll not lnterfere therew~th unless lt appears 
that ne acted ln excess of h~s powers or-that 
he abusec hls dlscretlon that hls actlon was 
caprlclous or arbltrary. See also NCRB v. 
Hearst Publlcatlons, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130, 
88 L.Ed. 1170, 64 S.Ct. 851 (1944) and Hotel 
Utah Co. v. Industrial Comm., 116 Utah ~211 
P.2d 200, 203 (1949) (empnasis added). Id. at 
641. 
1 Central Bank involved a complaint filed in district court pursuant to 
§7-1-26(4), Utah Code Ann., 1953, ~hich allo~s an appeal from the Bank 
Co=issioner' s rulings. The appeal alleged that the Conrrnissioner )-,ad 
"acted cap-riciously and arbitraril,·, and contrarv to la••, in denyi:1g itS 
application" for a branch in Spring,•ille. The Supreme Court affirmed tr'' 
district court's sustaining of t~e Co~issione~'s decision because it 
had sufficient support in the findings. 
_ 1 II _ 
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This court has recognized the existence of the various 
shades of meaning of the term "trial de novo." In Denver & 
R.G.W.R. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 98 Utah 431, 100 P.2d 552 
(1940), the court noted that such a trial could entail either 
a complete retrial upon new evidence or a trial upon the record 
made before the lower tribunal. In analyzing the particular 
statute, the court opted for a complete retrial. The test to 
be applied to deciding this issue was further refined in Denver 
R.G.W.R. Co. v. Central Weber Sevier Improvement District, 
Utah2d 105, 287 P.2d 884, 886 (1955). The court indicated 
that a trial de novo was only appropriate if there was no record 
to review or if the procedures used at the hearing might be 
violative of due process .. To this same effect see Citizens 
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 28 L.Ed.2d 136, 
91 S.Ct. 814 (197l)and Camp v. Pitts, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 1243, 
411 U.S. 138, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973). 
It thus becomes imperative to analyze the nature of the 
appeal statute involved. In cases where the Administrator is 
contemplating denying the aoplication for a motor vehicle 
dealer'slicense, Utah Code Ann., §41-3-24, directs that written 
notice be sent to the applicant setting forth a date on which 
a hearing will be held before the Administrator for the purpose 
of hearing evidence and argument in support of granting the 
a~plication. Section 24 further directs that the Administrator 
~y request the attendance of the Advisory Board (a board of 
five members created by U.C.A., §41-3-9, which consists of 
individuals whom are motor vehicle dealers, motor vehicle 
- 15 -
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wreckers or transporters) or direct the hearing to be held 
before said Board. If, as in the present case, the matter is 
referred to the Advisory Board, the Board must make written 
findings of fact with appropriate references to the mandatory 
stenographic record of the hearing. In addition, the Board 
makes recommendations based upon its findings and any dissentin~ 
members may file their own findings of fact and recommendations,, 
which become a part of the record. 
It would seem that the intent of such an extensive pro-
cedure is to insure a fair and adequate hearing of the matter 
and to create and preserve a record that could serve as a basis 
for judicial review. It would appear most illogical to provide 
for the creation of a special board made up of individuals witl ' 
expertise in the motor vehicle business who are charged with the 
duty of evaluating the fitness of another individual to obtaina 
special license which entitles such a person to do business 
in the State of Utah and to require that they hire a stenographe: 
make written findings and a recommendation to the Administrator 
only to have it auotmatically go for naught once an appeal is 
merely filed in district court. It is obvious that every 
individual who has been denied a license upon action of the 
Advisory Board and Administrator will appeal to the district 
court if he gets a true trial de novo with no deference to the 
administrative proceeding below. This vwuld follow since he has 
nothing to lose and everything to gain. 
The deference to the administrative proceedings in the 
licensing of motor vehicle dealers is further demonstrated by 
- 16 -
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making reference to Utah Code Ann., §41-3-24 and 25. Section 
24 goes to great length to insure substantial notice and other 
due process considerations. Section 25 empowers the Administra-
tor with extensive subpoena powers over witnesses and papers 
both in behalf of the administrative body and the app_~cant. 
Again, the appellant will submit that such extensive instruction 
provided by the legislature indicates its intent to make the 
administrative proceeding the primary determinant of the right 
to a motor vehicle dealer's license. The very section which 
gave the respondents the right to appeal the Administrator's 
decision is the same section which requires written findings by 
the Administrator when making his decision. It is the appellant's 
vigorous contention that when Utah Code Ann., §41-3-26, provides 
that an applicant may appeal by filing an original action that 
it simply affords the applicant complete due process of law by 
providing a review of administrative action to ascertain whether 
the administrative body acted properly and within the bounds 
of the law. 
This "review only" position argued by appellant, finds 
additional support by making reference to the statutorily 
provided administrative proceeding referred to above and the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) and B:(d). Rule 
Bl(d) makes the provisions of Rule 52(a) applicable to this 
review of an administrative decision when it reads: 
"These Rules shall apply to the practice 
and procedure ln appeallng from or oo~aln­
ing a review of any order, rullng or other 
action of an administratlve board or agency, 
except in so far as the speclflc statutory 
procedure in connection with any such appeal 
or review is in conflict or inconsistent 
with these Rules." (Emphasis added.) 
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Therefore, Rule 52(a) would be applicable and the 
history of the rule is helpful in the instant proceeding. 
Rule 52(a) reads in part as follows: 
"In all actions tried upon the facts without 
a jury or with an advisory jury, the court 
shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon ... " 
In so requiring, one of the major purposes is to 
provide a record for later review courts of appeal. This 
follows in light of the following facts. As noted in the 
compiler's notes following Rule 52(a), as set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. (1953), this rule is based upon Rule 52(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Taking this history, Wright 
and Miller's observation of the history of Rule 52(a) as 
contained in Federal Practice and Procedure, Vol. 9, becomes 
relevant. Those authors explain that this former equity practi~ 
is applied to all civil actions tried without a jury "to aid 
the appellate court by affording it a clear understanding of 
the ground or basis of the decision .... " Id.at 679. Other 
reasons are also given, but the prime cor.sideration given by 
most courts is the creation of a record to review on appeal. 
The highest court in New Jersey so stated when it said: 
"In recent years this court has been called 
upon frequently to point out that such 
findings are of the utmost imoortance, not 
only in insuring a responsible and just 
determination by the board but also in 
according a proper basis for the judicial 
review which is expressly afforded by 
statute and rules." Pennsylvania R. ~:::. v. 
Dept. of Public Utilities, 14 N.J. 4ll, 102 
A.2d 618, 626 (1954). See also Boise Water 
Corp. v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n, 97 
Idaho 832, 555 P.2d 163 (1976). 
- 18 -
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The Tenth Circuit also considers findings of fact 
essential as is demonstrated by the following: 
"The intended purpose of the rule 
[52(a) FRCP] is to aid the appellate 
court in acquiring a clear understanding 
of the basis of the decision .... " State 
of Utah v. U.S., 304 F. 2d 23 (lOth Cir. 
1962), cert. denied 83 S. Ct. 47, 371 
u.s. 826. 9 L. Ed. 2D 65. See also, 
Whitney v. Continental Life, 403 P.2d 573, 
l:l9 Idaho 96 (1965), and Merrill v. Merrill, 
362 P. 2d 887, 83 Idaho 306 (1961). 
The legislature went to great length in providing an 
extensive and expensive two-tiered administrative proceeding. 
The initial tier or level, the hearing before the advisory 
board, requires a stenographic record, written findings of 
fact, and recommendations based thereon at the conclusion 
of all testimony and argument. In addition, any dissenting 
member may dissent in writing and this is expressly made a 
part of the record. The second tier is the decision by the 
administrator which must be in writing officially signed by 
him with reference to the stenographic report of the hearing 
as the basis of his action. 
The appellant submits that all of the above discussions 
lead to the logical conclusion that Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-26 
merely provides for a judicial review and in so doing requires 
the district court to view the facts and the law governing 
the controversy at the time the administrative hearing took 
olace. The withdrawing of a conviction subsequent to the 
ad~inistrative hearing has no bearing on the instant controversy 
whatsoever. Moreover, the legislature should be given the 
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benefit of the statute that they enacted. This court has stat~ 
that where the intent is unclear, the intent of the legislature 
will prevail over the literal sense of meaning, and when words 
are not explicit, the intention is to be determined from the 
context of the statute. Rowley v. Public Service Commission, 
112 Utah 116, 185 P.2d 5!4 (1947). By placing § 41-3-26 
with its "appeal by filing an original action" language in 
context with the other provisions of the chapter dealing with 
such proceedings it becomes clear that the intent of the 
legislature was to provide a review of the record to determi~ 
the lawfulness of the administrative action. 
POINT III 
AS THE INSTANT PROCEEDING IS A 
REVIEW OF THE RECORD OF AN 
AD~INISTRATIVE PROCEEDING, THE 
FACTS BEFORE THIS COURT ARE THE 
FACTS AS THEY EXISTED ON THE 
DATE OF THE HEARING BEFORE THE 
ADVISORY BOARD 
As was established in Point II, supra, the proceeding 
before this court, at this, time is in the nature of a review 
and not a true trial de novo. Therefore, it becomes inc~~bent 
upon this court to determine whether the administrative body 
properly disposed of the matter. As was noted in Point II, 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-8, expressly gives convictions for 
violations of the motor vehicle code, applicable to dealers, 
as grounds for refusing a license to a prospective ap?licant. 
It seems clear that the relevancy of the conviction to the 
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denial of a license is the fact that the applicant has 
demonstrated a lack of regard for the very rules he promises 
to uphold if a license is issued to him. In short, the indivi-
dual's character is at issue and in doubt. 
With all this in mind, a rule of law established in 
Peterson v. Livestock Comm'n, 120 Mont. 140, 181 P.2d 152 
(1947), is proffered by appellant as applicable to the case 
at hand. 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 757 cites Peterson 
for the proposition that changes in law subsequent to an 
administrative order should not affect the consideration of the 
administrative decision on appeal, i.e., the court on appeal 
should apply the substantive law in effect when the agency 
made its order. The Peterson court reasoned: 
"It is our conclusion that since the function 
of the court on appeal is simply to determine 
whether the commission acted properly and 
according to law, the court in determining 
that question must apply the law in effect 
w!-len the commission acted." 181 P.2d at 157. 
Appellant submits that the reasoning of the Peterson 
court correspondingly mandates that the facts as they existed 
when the commission acted, are the facts that the reviewing 
court looks at on appeal from a decision of the administrator 
of the 1'-lotor Vehicle Business Administration. 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted this basic rule in 
Archer v. Utah State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 392 P.2d 622, 
624 (1964) \vhen it stated: 
"[0] rdinarily the facts and the law in a 
given lawsuit are to be applied as of the 
date of the filing of the original complaint." 
- 21 -
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'The court made this statement in response to an argument that 
a change in law between the filing of an original complaint 
and an amended complaint divested the court of jurisdiction. 
For an additional situation wherein a court applied this 
principle to a change in fact situation see Heldenbrand v. 
Montana St. Bd. of Reg. for P.E. & L.S. 1 147 Mont. 271 1 41 
P.2d 744 (1966). 
Appellant simply urges the court to review the action 
of the administrator in that context. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred when it substituted its judgment 
for that of the administrative body because the court only had 
jurisdiction to review the propriety of the administrative 
order. The expungement of Mr. Noren's convictions should have 
been of no concern to the court in any capacity in which it 
heard the case because the convictions are always admissible as 
to the issue of an individual's character and corresponding 
fitness to hold a public license. Appellant asks this court 
to reverse the lower court so as to sustain the decision of 
the Administrator of the Utah State ~~otor Vehicle Business 
Administration. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of September 1 1979. 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
~1ARK I~. BUC!1 I 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent/ 
.<'I;Jpe 11 ant 
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